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ABSTRACT
This article explores the ongoing condition of the ombudsman sector through models of 
change adopted from the social science literature. Debates about change are fleshed out 
through an analysis of the ombudsman/tribunal’s partnership initiative currently 
underway. As well as providing an explanation for the slow process of reform, the article 
highlights the need for further research into the partnership initiative to detail the 
strengths, weaknesses and sustainability of such bottom-up reform agendas in the 
administrative justice system. We conclude that the impact of each individual initiative 
is likely to be minor but as a process they represent important moments of institutional 
learning which, in the context of current crisis, could operate as catalysts for major 
administrative justice reform. 
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Introduction
With a particular focus on the public services ombudsman1 sector in England, this article 
explores two questions about change agendas within the administrative justice system. First 
why is major reform so difficult to implement? Second, what are the most likely conditions for 
facilitating major reform? 
These are long-standing concerns in the ombudsman sector where, for over twenty 
years, major reform efforts have regularly stalled despite widespread acceptance of the need 
for legislative overhaul (e.g. PASC 2014, Kirkham and Gill 2020). The relevance of these 
questions was further highlighted by the events that took place as this article was finalised. As 
the full seriousness and impact of the coronavirus pandemic begun to emerge, historic 
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economic measures were announced to transfer responsibility of large chunks of the private 
sector to the public realm (HM Treasury 2020), and extraordinary civil liberty infringing 
powers were granted to the Executive (Coronavirus Act 2020). Even before the final toll on the 
UK and elsewhere became known, this looked like a moment of profound change which, 
amongst its other impacts, would alter for generations the way that we think about the role of 
the state. 
Although reform of the administrative justice system will not be the immediate focus 
of attention when public administration eventually re-establishes itself around a new normal, 
it is inevitable that the nature of the product that public service providers will be delivering will 
alter beyond recognition. In turn, perceptions of administrative justice are likely to change and 
those administrative justice institutions (AJIs) charged with delivering redress will be expected 
to adjust their operations in response.
In exploring the practical challenges for administrative justice reform that these 
dynamics will create, this article draws upon the wider academic literature to provide a 
framework for understanding how and when change occurs. Some of this literature has 
previously been applied to the administrative justice system by Le Sueur (2012). Where this 
article takes this work further is in modelling the likely reactions of stakeholders to the 
perceived need for major reform, including reasons for resistance. This approach also assists 
in anticipating the circumstances in which radical initiatives might eventually be successful. 
This article identifies three key factors which influence the dynamics of change 
agendas. The first is the collection of inherent pressures that discourage reforms that too 
radically disrupt the existing structure (Gersick 1991, p. 18). These pressures create a bias 
towards bottom-up incremental reform measures, whereby local actors respond to new 
circumstances by identifying ‘better’ solutions within existing policy and legal frames. The 
second is the habit of key stakeholders to possess what has sometimes been referred to as a 
‘conservative disposition’ (Gee and Webber 2019). This disposition entails a pragmatic 
acceptance of incremental methods of change over radical reform and a preference for local 
control over the process of reform. The third feature is the periodical tendency of human 
systems towards moments of radical change (Gersick 1991). Even though institutions and 
individuals benefit from and prefer stability, occasional disruptive and formative moments 
intermittently occur (Rothstein 1992). These formative moments force a realignment of the 
dominant policy paradigms and institutional forms through which business is ordinarily 
conducted (Hall 1993). 
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After outlining this explanatory theory of change, the article works through these three 
features of reform in turn, as they apply to the ombudsman sector. To illustrate the tendency of 
the sector to evolve through organic and bottom-up reform, one current endeavour, the 
ombudsman/tribunals partnership familiarisation initiative (the OT partnership), is analysed. 
This initiative has been developed by local actors and relies upon improving communication 
and shared learning between individual ombuds and tribunals. This partnership aspires to 
improve capacity and performance through a more integrated complaints service where 
jurisdictions overlap. Senior figures in the administrative justice system though have proposed 
that more powerful reform measures should be built into this partnership initiative.
We suggest that the impact of the OT partnership is likely to be minor, and use this 
example to highlight the limitations of incremental reform. Nevertheless, even before the 
coronavirus outbreak, the partnership represented an important stepping stone in creating the 
conditions for major administrative justice reform. This is because its strength lies not so much 
in the measures being introduced, but its signalling of a growing agreement amongst a wide 
constituency both of the need for more radical reform and the forms of shift in policy that are 
required to redesign the system. We conclude by asking whether the final set of barriers against 
reform in the sector have now been removed by the coronavirus outbreak, thereby creating the 
necessary conditions for a radical new shift in the administrative justice system.      
Theories of change
Natural barriers to major reform
To model how and why change occurs, this article deploys concepts of ‘social learning’ and 
‘organisational change’, as used widely in the social sciences including political science 
(Rothstein 1992), organisational theory (Gersick 1991), economics (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004), public administration (Hay 2001) and energy policy (Kern et al 2014). Of most 
relevance for this paper, Le Sueur (2012) has used these ideas to map different forms of redress 
design in the administrative justice system. 
Theories of social learning describe how during ordinary ‘periods of equilibrium’ 
institutions and decision-making processes operate within an overarching ‘deep structure’ 
(Gersick 1991, pp. 13-16) or ‘policy paradigm’ (Hall 1993, pp. 278–9). This structure frames 
the ways in which problems are perceived and addressed. Change to policy, processes and 
methods can occur within periods of equilibrium, but the forms that change takes is shaped and 
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restricted by the dominant policy paradigm, existing legal instruments and ongoing 
relationships between different established decision-makers (Kern et al 2014, p. 416). The 
strength of this heavily structured operational framework is such that in most human systems 
it is hard to introduce major reform, which in turn creates a bias towards incremental reform. 
At least four main reasons for this behavioural pattern can be identified (Gersick 1991).2
The first is that major change does not occur because of a lack of cognition, or 
awareness, of the alternatives to the present structure, or if alternatives are available they are 
poorly thought-through or ‘construed on the basis of assumptions about human nature that are 
too optimistic’ (Beckstein 2019, p. 627). Even where candidate reform packages exist, they 
look unviable or carry costs of transition that outweigh any reasonably foreseeable benefits.
Second, there are strong motivations on the part of key stakeholders to avoid the 
uncertainties and fears of failure that would accompany the introduction of radical change 
(Gersick 1991, p. 18). This reticence to adapt too fast may be strong, even when imperfection 
in current systems and institutions is widely acknowledged (Beckstein 2019, pp. 625-7). 
Further, there are considerable sunk costs invested in stable and long-standing processes and 
institutions, and the actors and office-holders involved in those systems will be incentivised to 
protect this investment and their position if there is a risk of them losing control over their 
situation (Gersick 1991, p. 18). Change also brings with it risks of undermining the store of 
accumulated practical knowledge and interdependent relationships built up in existing 
arrangements (Gee and Webber 2019, pp. 539-40). 
A third explanation for the rarity of major reform and the dominance of patterns of 
equilibrium ‘is that systems benefit from this kind of persistence’ (Gersick 1991, p. 19: 
emphasis added). Stability in any human organisation or process allows it to ‘become skilled 
at what it does’ (ibid) and means that participants can detail, improve and even experiment 
with their roles with the confidence that success will be rewarded and failure dealt with through 
prospectively understood processes. There may also be powerful symbolic and existence value 
in the institution that might be damaged if it were to be materially altered (Beckstein 2019, p. 
626). 
Finally, decision-makers within systems are under a series of overriding obligations to 
operate within a particular set of relationships and processes, the most powerful of which are 
established by the democratic process (Cortell and Peterson 1999, 184). As a result, even if the 
other barriers to change can be overcome, the practical power of those obligations will prevent 
change (Gersick 1991, p. 19).
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A preference for incremental change 
Adopting a stance that radical change is not needed does not entail that change does not occur, 
instead it captures a belief that incremental and cautious reform is more likely to secure better 
results. Modelling these different approaches, Hall distinguishes three ‘orders’ of change which 
vary in the magnitude of their impact on the way that institutions and processes operate (Hall 
1993). Of the three, ‘first order’ change best describes this preference for incremental evolution 
over radicalism. First order changes are those measures that ‘fine-[tune] existing procedures or 
changes in practices’ (ibid, p. 281). Their purpose is to improve the system, to make it work 
better given the context and policy paradigm that it currently operates within. First order 
changes do not rely upon obtaining fresh legal powers and work organically through local 
institutions and/or existing consensus in the sector. Such changes are common and will 
generally be driven and implemented from the bottom up and will not require high level policy 
input. The OT partnership looked at below is a typical example of first order change.
In the context of administrative justice, here we suggest three positive reasons why this 
approach may appear an attractive solution, particularly to local decision-makers.  
The first reason is that first order change usually relies on those most closely involved 
in operating the system, such as AJIs, collating their ‘coal-face’ experience of pressure points 
to operate as early ‘fire-alarms’ systems that highlight the need for adaptation (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). This form of monitoring is considered beneficial because local decision-
makers are in a better position to identify problems than more distant layers of authority. 
Indeed, often there is no other viable choice. 
A second advantage is that first order change relies on local decision-makers who are 
more likely to care about the inherent values of the system they are designed to promote and 
deliver. This attachment of local decision-makers to the values of the system comes both 
through their training and reputational needs (Black 2008). Thus, in order to maintain the faith 
of their clientele, they are directly motivated to seek out solutions and be innovative and 
experimental if necessary. 
A third and linked advantage of first order change is that operating on the ground local 
decision-makers are more readily in–tune with the epistemic knowledge required to solve 
problems (Lipsky 1980). This includes being better equipped to integrate new information into 
the design of processes, and to respond quickly and fine-tune systems if things do not work as 
well as anticipated. They are also better aware, not just of the problems but of the parallel 
dynamics in which they operate. This makes them well situated to identify opportunities for 
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improvements and the availability of possible partnerships, as for instance with the OT 
partnership.  
A faith in the power of bottom-up solutions, therefore, is driven by a belief that being 
more connected to actual practice, and arguably more motivated to deliver underlying goals of 
the system, local decision-makers are in a strong position to identify gaps in provision when 
they occur, and develop new workable solutions at an appropriate pace. This approach also 
allows local decision-makers to assess what has value in the existing model, and hence needs 
preservation, and what might be deemed redundant and disposable. Local decision-makers may 
be attracted to this approach because it grants them more control. Additionally, given the 
potential for unwanted, ill-informed and poorer solutions to be imposed on the sector which 
may have unforeseeable side-effects, they are incentivised to avoid higher level intervention, 
such as from government or the legislature (Gee and Webber 2019, pp. 535-6). 
The periodic underlying demand for more radical change
As we detail below, when applied to the ombudsman sector, the theory of change outlined up 
to this point provides multiple forms of explanation as to why radical change has not occurred 
and arguments in favour of incrementalism. Nevertheless, although incrementalism, as 
predicted in Hall’s model of first order change, may be the dominant pattern, more powerful 
forms of change do occasionally occur. 
To begin with, not all incremental change is controlled by local decision-makers. Thus 
Hall anticipates the need for ‘second order’ changes (Hall 1993, p. 282), which ‘are more 
significant than first order changes in that they establish novel techniques, new procedures or 
institutions for carrying out redress’ (Le Sueur 2012, p. 21). These forms of change often 
require legislative amendment and new budgets, and hence necessarily involve a wider range 
of actors, especially the Executive and Parliament. Examples include the multiple new 
complaint-handling schemes that have been introduced in recent years (Kirkham forthcoming) 
and amendments to existing ombudsman legislation. This form of change, however, is similar 
in intent to first order change, insofar as the aim is to make the existing policy paradigm work 
given the context, not to restructure significantly the way that the system operates. To achieve 
the latter outcome, what are needed are ‘third order’ changes.
Although ‘third order’ changes may involve new legislation, more important are the 
broader cultural shifts in policy-making that they facilitate. Through third order changes an 
attempt is made to push a range of actors towards the adoption of different ways of thinking 
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about problems and the pursuit of entirely new approaches and solutions (Hall 1993, p. 282). 
The impact is to break down or fundamentally alter existing policy paradigms and the deep 
structure of the system. The original Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 can be seen in this 
light. Although the 1967 Act was ultimately a watered-down version of the reform that was 
originally proposed (Whyatt 1961), it came about as part of a wider sea-change in attitudes 
towards administrative justice. This formative moment encouraged new dispute resolution 
mechanisms to be introduced which have ever since been regularly turned to by governments 
and other policy-makers (Blake et al 2010).  
Such radicalism occurs infrequently. 
First and second order change can be seen as cases of ‘normal policymaking,’ namely of a process 
that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm ... . Third order 
change, by contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in 
the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a ‘paradigm shift.’ If first and second 
order changes preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order change 
is often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy (Hall 1993, p. 
279). 
The normal pattern of policy-making, therefore, is one of ‘iterative evolutionary cycles’ (Hay, 
2001, pp. 200–202) in which various strategies of reform are attempted to improve, patch-up 
and make do the existing policy paradigm. The social learning theory of change, however, 
postulates that there will be limits within the existing policy paradigm as to what can be 
achieved through such techniques. To break the pattern, what is needed are periodic 
transformations. 
Such breaks to settled equilibrium are rare, unpredictable and by no means inevitable. 
Research across multiple subject fields shows that even when prolonged periods of 
experimentation with an old policy paradigm continually lead to struggles and failings (Walsh, 
2000, pp. 486-7), significant change often does not happen (Beckstein 2019, pp. 625-7). Within 
the literature opinion differs on the conditions that are most likely to facilitate policy paradigm 
change, but Cortell and Peterson highlight three factors as being necessary - triggers, 
institutional opportunity and change-oriented preferences (1999). 
‘Triggers’ are ordinarily thought of as unanticipated events which create large-scale 
public dissatisfaction, sometimes fear. However, electoral landslides, sustained demographic 
shifts or international movements might also act as triggers for domestic change. The key is 
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the extent such moments call into question the established institutional structures and discredit 
the adequacy of current policy (ibid, pp. 184-5). 
The importance of triggers is that they create ‘windows of opportunity’ for deep 
structural change (Kingdon 1984). The likelihood of the opportunity being acted upon depends 
on the strength of societal demands for change and the scope for autonomous political action 
(Cortell and Peterson 1999, pp. 185-7). The window for change is larger when the trigger event 
creates significant costs for political elites that are not seen to respond. Even so, new ideas are 
unlikely to be implemented unless they coalesce with, or at least do not conflict with, prevailing 
political opinion (Walsh 2000, pp. 487-8). Change, therefore, becomes more likely when cross-
society agreement on the need for change can be observed, which thereby frees up the political 
space for decisive action. 
Even if a window of opportunity has been created, there will be challenges in bringing 
about change if new ideas conflict with existing institutional missions and priorities, and if 
multiple agencies are impacted. These challenges will be more easily overcome if the ‘change-
oriented preferences’ of key stakeholders are aligned and relevant interest groups are willing 
to act as policy entrepreneurs for new ideas (Cortell and Peterson 1999, pp. 187-191, Walsh 
2000, p. 487, Oliver and Pemberton 2004). Building the support of stakeholders heavily 
invested in the current structure may require prolonged periods of institutional learning, but if 
such a process can convert the viewpoint of inherently establishment voices then the demand 
for change becomes ever more compelling and likely to occur. On this point, and contrary to 
the analysis offered above, the naturally conservative disposition of pre-established institutions 
can carry the seeds of a powerful argument for change. Change can become understood as 
renovative in nature, if the environment within which existing institutions and processes 
operate has altered so significantly that they struggle to deliver the core function that they have 
long been designed to deliver (Beckstein 2019, pp. 627-32). In such circumstances, in order to 
preserve the most important elements of the established system and to counter-balance 
developments outside of their control, key stakeholders may be persuaded that it is ‘necessary 
to acquiesce in change on secondary issues’ (Huntington 1957, p. 455). 
On the process by which radical change occurs, there is disagreement in the literature 
(eg Hay 2001). Plausibly, there may be definitive time limited ‘revolutionary’ moments that 
mark the shift in policy paradigm, as in response to a single event or crisis (Gersick 1991, 
Greener 2001, p. 134). It is equally likely, however, that change is more evolutionary and 
messier in nature, occurring through a series of smaller but significant ‘sub-set’ adjustments 
being injected into the old paradigm in response to several crises, until eventually the old is 
9
more or less completely replaced (Cortell and Peterson 1999, Oliver and Pemberton 2004, pp. 
434-36; Kern et al 2014, pp. 524-5).
Lessons for the administrative justice system
The theory of change outlined above offers an explanatory frame only and has limited 
predictive value (e.g. Blyth 1997, Gee and Webber 2019, p. 549). Nevertheless, in this article 
it is argued that three embedded features of the administrative justice system are accurately 
captured by this framework, each of which heavily impacts on how individual AJIs strategize 
their reform efforts. 
First, radical reform is discouraged by the way that the system of British public 
administration is devised. The effect is that AJIs are incentivised not to rely upon government 
intervention and to explore incremental and bottom-up opportunities for change.   
Second, AJIs value the advantages that come with pursuing change through the organic 
development of small-scale measures. This form of change allows for institutional autonomy, 
making it easier to foster experimentation, develop bottom-up ideas and protect the underlying 
values and strengths of existing institutions.
Third, the space for more radical solutions, although entirely unpredictable in 
occurrence, does sometimes become available. Such changes may occur in response to bottom-
up demand but it is more likely that AJIs have to be opportunistic in pursuing their change 
agendas, attaching themselves to broader governmental objectives and changes in political 
thinking. Crisis may also be a major contributor to radical reform in generating new ideas and 
forcing governments to ditch old ways of thinking.
In the following section, the manner in which these themes have played out in the 
ombudsman sector are explored, with a particular focus on the OT partnership.
The dominance of incremental approaches to change in the ombudsman sector
The long history of blocked reform
In the ombudsman sector, of the standard barriers to major change identified above, a cognitive 
lack of awareness of the possibilities is a minor factor. Reform was formally touted by the 
(then) three ombudsman offices in England as long ago as 1998 in a joint letter to the Cabinet 
Office. This letter prompted a review which led to proposals for major reform (Cabinet Office 
2000). A later report by the Law Commission in 2011 made further recommendations for 
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reform (Law Commission 2011), as did another government commissioned report in 2014 
(Gordon 2014), and the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) in 2014 (PASC 
2014). In 2016 the government even went as far as to publish draft legislation (Cabinet Office 
2016) and successful alternative models exist in each of the devolved nations (eg Scottish 
Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002, Public Services Ombudsman Act (Northern Ireland) 
2016, Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2019) and multiple other common law 
systems. Academics have also developed a manifesto for new legislation (Kirkham and Gill 
2020).  
The key blocks on radical reform, therefore, are not lack of cognition but the 
motivations of various stakeholders to accept the need for such change, the perceived benefits 
of persisting with the old ombudsman model and the strength of existing obligations. In 
examining these factors, the constraining force of the external environment on the ombudsman 
sector will be considered in this section, before looking at the internal motivations of local 
decision-makers to favour organic reform. 
External barriers to reform 
Above all, the ombudsman sector has to operate within the confines of statute and budgets 
sanctioned by the Executive. These obligations make government support for reform essential, 
as most proposals require the introduction of techniques and powers that are not currently 
provided for. 
A key challenge here is that the motivation for governments to focus on ombudsman 
reform is low. Administrative justice reform rarely has high political salience and it is more in 
the interest of governments to herald progress in public service delivery than render transparent 
maladministration. Further, providing for oversight and redress is costly, and operates to 
restrict the freedom of public service providers. There may even be incentives for abolishing 
AJIs, or reducing their influence, if they are perceived as getting in the way of delivering public 
service solutions or providing ineffective forms of oversight (Schillemans 2010). This is not to 
say that promoting administrative justice does not occasionally become a powerful political 
issue,3 only that there are natural public administration incentives to prevent it from becoming 
one. 
On the positive, ombuds help steer disputes away from the courts and hence offer a 
solution for politicians looking to provide a relatively low-cost and time-friendly answer for 
electorate concerns in the justice arena (Creutzfeldt 2018). This attribute means that second 
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order change has occurred regularly in the ombudsman sector, through the creation of multiple 
new schemes over the last fifty years (Kirkham forthcoming). However, although creating an 
ombudsman to address a new problem is politically marketable, selling reform of an existing 
office does not carry the same political attraction, particularly if the proposal comes with the 
potential for an increase in budgetary expectations and scrutiny. Thus the English demand for 
reform remains unresolved after a debate of over twenty years. A similar, albeit more 
optimistic, story of slow progress towards legislative reform can be seen in the devolved 
nations. In the case of Northern Ireland, it took 12 years to secure reform (COFM 2015, p. 4), 
with Wales six years (CLAC 2018, p.7), whilst in Scotland proposals to reform remain 
ongoing.
One explanation for these long gestation periods is that, in England at least, there is a 
coordination problem in the administrative justice system. Even small and localised change can 
involve multiple actors, making the process of organising reform difficult. Where reform offers 
an ambitious agenda, involved actors may include ministers, legislators, civil servants, redress 
agents, service providers and other stakeholders, such as users. Here the attempts to garner the 
collective acquiescence of multiple actors to reform is made tougher still by the absence of any 
clear organising frame to conduct reform. Responsibility for administrative justice is dissipated 
across a range of government departments and select committees, and there is no formal 
advisory body to oversee the system (The Public Bodies (Abolition of Administrative Justice 
and Tribunals Council) Order 2013).
Without a powerful and enthusiastic political sponsor, there are practical limits in what 
can be achieved in adjusting the legal constraints on AJIs. Ultimately an ombudsman is reliant 
upon their associated government department to process legislative reform, and larger scale 
reform measures require the input of the Cabinet Office, the agenda of which is closely attuned 
to high-level political priorities. Getting around this logjam, in Northern Ireland (COFM 2015) 
and Wales (e.g. CLAC 2018) legislative reform was delegated to select committees, but at 
Westminster equivalent support is unlikely to be sufficient to shift the government’s control of 
the legislative agenda. 
Internalised first order responses to external restrictions
The above reasons provide practical explanations for why public services ombuds in England 
remain unreformed, with only a few minor legislative amendments having been passed in 
recent decades (The Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc between Ombudsmen) Order 2007). 
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Thus, whilst ombuds often argue and lobby for legislative change, such calls become dissipated 
across a range of actors with limited power or incentive or take forward change agendas. This 
leaves the sector’s focus invariably drawn instead towards maximising local opportunities to 
upgrade existing internal processes. 
An additional challenge is that, like all AJIs, ombuds are obliged to operate reactively 
to broader political developments in the delivery of public services and the wider political 
economy. Such developments might trigger opportunities for change, but the foundations of 
such work may not be ideal and the relevant actors may not be able to prioritise their redress 
design role when implementing change (Le Seuer 2012, 18). As a result, what change that does 
occur may be more managerial and budget-driven than service-enhancing in focus. By way of 
example, austerity policies cut budgets at the Local Government Ombudsman office 
dramatically, resulting in multiple organisational changes being made to achieve efficiencies, 
including a reduction in its advisory function to citizens (Thomas et al 2013). 
First order change, however, does not necessarily have to be reactive to top down 
pressure or events, nor does it have to be an insular process. Like most human systems, ombuds 
possess a reputation-protecting need to address problems within their sphere of responsibility 
(Black 2008) and can often be highly entrepreneurial in identifying solutions. To illustrate this 
dynamic potential, the example that is explored further in the next section is an ongoing 
partnership initiative between the ombuds and tribunals.
The strengths and limits of incremental evolution: the ombudsman/ tribunal partnership 
Motivations to control and persist
The OT partnership illustrates the natural motivations of local decision-makers to pursue 
incremental reform, as well as its advantages. It also, however, highlights the limitations of this 
approach to reform. The partnership is an entirely non-governmental initiative and is driven by 
local actors. It started out as an idea scribbled on the back of a napkin by the then leaders of 
the First-Tier Tribunal and the Independent Complaints Reviewer (ICR). This led to a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU), which created an information sharing arrangement 
(ICR 2010, p. 6). The MoU arguably allowed the two bodies to become more robust and 
provide a better service, until the ICR’s remit was later dissolved. The spirit of this initiative 
has since been resurrected elsewhere. In order to promote exchange, engagement and best-
practice, from 2019 the First Tier Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND) Tribunal 
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and the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman have been working together, 
developing their own MoU and identifying areas where cooperation would be mutually 
beneficial. This project is currently underway ‘behind closed doors’ with the hope that, once a 
pilot is set up, it is monitored, evaluated and will serve as a learning example for other 
initiatives.4 The next pair of bodies that is having initial conversations to set up a pilot is the 
Housing Ombudsman and the property chamber, and the PHSO are currently exploring 
opportunities for partnerships with the tribunals sector (AJC 2020). 
In practice, the OT partnership is in its very early stages but larger goals have been 
identified as plausible through the arrangement. Perhaps the most ambitious claim that could 
be made for its potential can be found in a lecture by Lord Justice Ryder, the then Senior 
President for Tribunals (2019). Mirroring observations made by his predecessor (Sullivan 
2015), Ryder diagnosed many of the problems facing the administrative justice system and 
mooted a series of proposals to address those failings. In doing so, Ryder identified the 
partnership between ombuds and tribunals as a key vehicle for realising administrative justice 
goals. Importantly, in advancing these proposals he made no mention of legislative reform as 
an aspiration for the partnership. 
Identifying problems
As identified earlier, a potential benefit of a bottom-up approach to administrative justice 
reform is that AJIs are in a better position to identify problems in the sector than government. 
AJIs possess this capacity, as through their role they cannot avoid the challenges of dealing 
with the problems experienced by users of public services (Ryder 2019, p. 3). Indeed, the 
identification of problems in the over-stretched nature of the system is a theme that can 
regularly be seen in the output of leading ombuds (e.g. Behrens 2018) and the judiciary (Ryder 
2019). 
The ground level concern that the OT partnership addresses is the overlap in 
administrative justice responsibility between different AJIs and the problems this causes. In 
several fields of public service provision, grievances on much the same subject-matter can be 
pursued through a tribunal or an ombudsman, albeit the formal grounds may be different. 
Occasionally, individuals will pursue grievances in one forum unaware that it is not the best 
option available to them. This is a classic example of the silo approach to administrative justice. 
With no single-entry point to advise the citizen or manage the overlap in responsibilities 
between the two institutions, the potential is created for confusion and frustration for the 
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individual citizen pursuing redress (e.g. AJTC 2011). Moreover, with different institutions 
operating mostly in isolation within their own areas of expertise information known in one 
branch of the system is not shared with other partner bodies, so reducing opportunities for 
efficiencies, joint problem-solving or institutional learning (Thomas and Tomlinson 2017, p. 
393).   
As the work of the Law Commission and academics in this field illustrate, other actors 
have also raised the alarm about this set of problems. Where local decision-makers have an 
advantage, however, is that given their direct and daily interaction with the system and users, 
they are better equipped to provide early warnings and to assess their urgency. In this respect, 
given that it is the most traditional and well-protected branch of the administrative justice 
system, expressions of support from the judiciary for radical reform, such as enhanced use of 
online dispute resolution and alternative dispute resolution methods, is a powerful development 
(e.g. Briggs 2016, Ryder 2019). Even here, cumulatively, the pressures on the old system are 
causing it to creak. 
Guardians of the values in a system are more motivated to respond to flaws 
A complementary claim in favour of organic change is that local actors are by way of training 
and reputation strongly incentivised to defend the values of the system and seek out solutions. 
Other stakeholders, such as government or external observers, are either less driven or have no 
power to secure reform. 
Evidence of the in-built reform-minded dynamic of human systems can be seen in the 
ombudsman sector. Ombuds have long looked to maximise the flexibility inherent in their 
autonomous position to facilitate change, either individually or through the Ombudsman 
Association (OA). The OA is a professional association which provides a support structure 
through which to share best practice, develop professional norms and even promote self-
regulation (e.g. Ombudsman Association 2017).
The OT partnership provides another example of the reform-minded energy contained 
in bottom-up action. Notably, all the innovations referred to here, plus others, are occurring 
without direct government support. The motivation to pursue this agenda can be seen in Lord 
Justice Ryder’s speech, where he urged a ‘conversation .... about joint working, mutual co-
operation and the creation of an administrative justice sector that our users value’ (Ryder 2019, 
p. 5). He has also argued for ‘[a] strong and single voice for change rooted in what our users 
want. They can and should be asked what do they want their justice space to be like’ (ibid, p. 
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3). This aspiration taps into a theme that has been very closely pursued in the ombudsman 
sector in recent times, and which has yet to be secured despite being long promoted by 
legislators (PASC 2014). The logic is that the users’ voice needs to be engaged and systems 
designed around what users want and expect, for instance in terms of a fair process and service 
provided (Creutzfeldt 2018). 
Local decision-makers as better problem-solvers
Another claim in favour of incremental change is that local decision-makers, in touch with live 
information streams and incentivised by the immediateness of the needs of the system, can 
produce better solutions and keep them updated according to the needs of the external 
environment. Again the OT partnership could potentially evidence some of these advantages. 
Whilst the evaluation of the OT partnership has to be a topic for future work, a clear 
gain could be an enhanced quality of service and better integration of the user experience. 
Confusion caused by the duplication of redress routes is one of the long-identified deficits in 
the user experience in the administrative justice system (Dunleavey et al 2010). Charging two 
of the institutions which cause this deficit with responsibility to establish and operate 
communication channels to manage this confusion could yield demonstrable gains. 
Communication with citizens could be improved, better information provided and the 
processing of grievances could be conducted more efficiently and appropriately. 
Additionally, local decision-makers are likely to be better aware, not just of the 
problems but of the parallel dynamics in which they operate. For instance, the tribunal system 
is currently managing massive changes in the way of modernising and digitalizing the justice 
system. These changes are being piloted and tested in several different contexts (Tomlinson 
2019), and there is potential through the OT partnership to cross-fertilise the lessons learned 
into the ombudsman sector.  
The limits of incremental change
There may be numerous benefits in pursuing change through bottom-up endeavours such as 
the OT partnership, but there are also real limits to this approach towards reform which the 
Ryders’s statement of ambition illustrates (2019). First order change works best where the 
objectives desired are not restricted by legal or other operational realities, and there is sufficient 
autonomy to adapt policies and processes. By contrast, where a change agenda challenges the 
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existing parameters of the legal powers of relevant bodies, then reform stalls without higher 
level input.  Several of the Ryder’s proposals reveal this dilemma.
One option for local decision-makers pursuing change is to push the boundaries of their 
existing powers to introduce new ways of operating. Ryder encourages this approach within 
the OT partnership by calling for the referral of cases ‘that are prima facie maladministration’ 
from ‘administrative courts and tribunals ... to an ombudsman’ (2019, p. 3). The difficulty for 
case-handlers charged with implementing this aspiration, however, is that there is little formal 
detail on the processes for actioning the referral of cases from courts and tribunals onto ombuds. 
Case handlers could be encouraged to use their discretion generously to take advantage of 
whatever informal channels there are available to AJIs to cajole claimants to transfer their 
grievance from one AJI to another to find the most suitable forum. This though is an approach 
that carries significant risks if a claimant is later denied the opportunity to pursue a remedy as 
a result of such a transfer. Further, it places an onus on AJIs to provide a fully informative 
‘triage’ service, which supplies the claimant with the appropriate information in which to make 
such a choice. The Law Commission ten years ago proposed that the civil procedure rules be 
amended to allow courts and tribunals to stay proceedings to facilitate such transfers, but 
received a lukewarm reception from the legal community (2011, p. 25) Current law is also 
unclear on the circumstances when a complainant can pursue a grievance both by way of a 
legal remedy and through the ombudsman (R v Local Commissioner For Local Government 
Ex p Liverpool [2000] EWCA Civ 54). Arguably, such double claiming is unlawful.
Similarly, Ryder proposes that when they become aware of public bodies making 
administrative errors on a systematic basis, tribunals should invite ombuds to investigate (2019, 
p. 3). This idea has a long heritage (Gill 2020), with the implicit suggestion being that 
organisationally, and in terms of powers, ombuds are better equipped to undertake broader 
systemic inquiries than the case-focused tribunals sector.  But in England and Scotland public 
services ombuds do not possess the power to launch an investigation, other than through a 
direct complaint. There is some flexibility in legislation which may facilitate ombuds taking 
on Ryder’s invitation by expanding individual investigations into systemic ones, although the 
court has placed some limits on how far a complaint can be expanded once it has been received 
(R (Cavanagh) v Health Service Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578). Building-up 
individual complaints to facilitate larger inquiries would require caseworkers to use their 
discretion more actively to find representative cases to build systemic investigations around. 
The fact that such discretionary power is not being widely used at present by ombuds, however, 
is one good reason to suggest that this is not an easy solution to apply. 
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Other proposals for change face an even stronger practical barrier, namely the lack of 
any legal power to take them forward. For instance, Ryder recommended: 
A ... power in an ombudsman to refer to the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal 
– which is a United Kingdom Superior Court of Record – any issues they believe require guidance 
by judicial review determination or individual redress beyond their powers (2019, p. 3).
By this proposal, ombuds might identify contentious interpretations of the law being applied 
by administrators on a systemic basis, and provide an important public service by highlighting 
these uncertainties and referring them to court. 
This proposal has precedence5  but the power of reference is there for only two schemes 
in the sector currently6 and would need statutory amendment to enable. Further, there are some 
practical question marks about how such a power would be best constructed (Law Commission 
2011, pp. 43-47), such as to do with funding and process, and legitimate concerns that such a 
power would create a pressure on ombuds to refer points of law to the courts, and even change 
the behaviour of complainants. The proposal, therefore, is one worthy of further consideration 
but amounts to at least a second order change. 
Finally, however ambitious local decision-makers might be, there are some measures that 
they are highly unlikely to be able to implement without a broader cultural resetting of the 
wider system. For instance, Ryder argued for: 
A programme of interoperability – and what do I mean by that – judges able to work as ombuds and 
vice-versa – not just collaboration and co-operation but career paths and that includes for our case 
workers and case officers.  One of our case officers has become a judge and others will follow.  
They have materially identical skills and abilities frameworks in both our services (2019, p. 3).
At its most radical this proposal sounds like a third order change which would involve not just 
developing stronger partnership arrangements, but in some respects allowing for a merger of 
functions and delivery in both the tribunal and ombudsman sectors. 
To bolster the legal competence of ombuds, interoperability could mean that a new form 
of career route is established. In Germany this dualist form of career route is common – and 
arguably has very beneficial effects within German legal culture (Creutzfeldt 2018). The 
typical set up in Germany is that there is only one ombudsman who leads the organisation. This 
position is usually filled by a retired judge and their decision-making staff are all lawyers. This 
way the system acquires acceptance and credibility from the German public. While decisions 
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are not binding, they take on a legal character and supplies ‘the German ombudsman model 
[with] a level of legal formality that is absent in the UK ombudsman schemes’ (Creutzfeldt 
2016, p. 14). By contrast, in the UK neither the office holder nor staff are required to follow a 
fixed route of professional training, and legal training is applied ad hoc to applicable legal 
contexts.  
There may be merits in considering this option, but both the tribunal and the 
ombudsman sector have distinct and jealously guarded characteristics and attributes that they 
might fear would be watered down if tribunal staff started working for ombuds, or vice versa. 
The ombudsman sector, in particular, would be nervous of any formalisation and dilution of 
the more ‘equitable’ form of justice currently delivered in the sector, especially if the judicial 
sector were given any further supervisory role over ombuds (e.g. Committee on Justice in 
Wales 2019, para. 6.50). 
Up to a point, in decision-making there is some interoperability already. Ombuds can 
make a finding of maladministration on the basis that the authority had breached the law 
(Kirkham 2006), albeit neither an enforceable or binding one. The degree to which this form 
of work is undertaken presently is unclear, although ombuds will naturally favour making 
findings on the basis of other factors. For tribunals to make ombudsman-like judgments in a 
tribunal case, however, raises altogether more complicated issues. For this proposal to work, a 
tribunal judge might need new legislative powers in order to be able to unpick information 
through an inquisitorial capacity, and to decide cases differently the evolution of a new ground 
of law equivalent to maladministration would be necessary. 
A new dawn? Searching for a third order paradigm change
To sum up, the OT partnership is the latest example of local decision-makers in the ombudsman 
sector operating autonomously to improve its capacity to respond to the demands placed upon 
it. However, although this initiative may do much to improve the quality of the user experience, 
without alterations to the legal remit of the AJIs involved more ambitious goals, as for instance 
expressed in the former Senior President’s lecture, are unlikely to be delivered, or sustained. 
Given this analysis, and the long track record of resistance to major reform in the ombudsman 
sector, in this concluding section we refer back to the earlier discussion of institutional theories 
of change and examine the prospects for the future. We predict three plausible scenarios.
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Continued weak incrementalism
The first scenario we label ‘continued weak incrementalism’. By this pattern, the existing 
structure within which ombuds operate will endure, leaving ombuds to address the demands 
placed upon them through outdated legislation and limited powers (Kirkham and Gill 2020). 
All ombuds will individually and collectively continue to experiment and tinker to make the 
best of the existing system, notwithstanding its acknowledged weaknesses. For instance, the 
OA is currently working on projects to build-up best practice in complaint-handling and 
promote peer review between different ombuds to nudge schemes towards higher standards of 
performance (Tyndall et al 2018). These initiatives, as with the OT partnership, have limits but 
offer some potential, and retain energy because they will be driven by a regular turnover of 
ambitious office-holders. 
This pattern of minor reform remains the most likely outcome, at least in the short term. 
However, the inevitability of this pattern is less certain than previously. Without the 
coronavirus pandemic, strategically advocates of major reform may have concluded that now 
is not the right time to push for legislative reform. The Conservative government’s known 
aversion to strong institutional oversight (Conservative Party 2019, p. 48), reduces confidence 
in it or Parliament being persuaded to support major reform. There are also risks that pushing 
for reform now might lead to adverse policy solutions being put forward which could worsen 
the sector’s position compared to the status quo (Beckstein 2019, p. 627). Much though has 
now changed to make major reform, at least in the medium term, more likely.
Are the conditions for third order change present?
In line with the theory of social learning outlined in this article, there are several reasons for 
believing that the conditions for the democratic acceptance of major reform in the 
administrative justice system have rarely been so favourable. 
To begin with, multiple overlapping trigger events have occurred which have thrown 
considerable doubt over the long-term stability of the dominant neo-liberal policy paradigm of 
the last few decades. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, austerity (e.g. UN Human Rights 
Council 2019) and Brexit had created the conditions for crisis and major third order change in 
public administration. Additionally, although smaller in impact, the ongoing process of 
digitalization has also shaken up the way that we think about the delivery of public services 
and administrative justice (Tomlinson 2019). On top of these events, the coronavirus pandemic 
is bound to create long-term shock waves through society. The direction of travel of public 
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administration is difficult to predict, but the prospects for triggering a renewed faith in the 
capacity of the state and professionalism appear strong.
Notwithstanding the power of these developments, under ordinary conditions it would 
remain likely that radical reform elsewhere in the administrative justice system would take 
priority over a niche issue such as ombudsman reform. The window of opportunity for major 
reform created by most triggers would be simply too small to retain the bandwidth of interest 
and attention necessary to encapsulate the renewal of AJIs. According to the literature on social 
learning, a key determinant of how long windows of opportunity stay open is the cost to 
established elites of failing to react to demands for reform (Cortell and Peterson 1999, pp. 186-
188), with a key cost the potential for a breakdown in authority and trust in the relevant human 
system (Hall 1993, p. 289). Trust is a difficult concept to measure, but along these lines the 
demand for administrative justice, and its acceptance by public authority, can be understood as 
primarily a vehicle through which trust in public administration is maintained (Vitale 2018). 
Further, the importance of maintaining a robust network of AJIs to deliver redress and trust in 
the system can be seen as highly relevant at certain key moments in the past, such as during 
the fifties and sixties (e.g. Franks 1957, Whyatt 1961). Through such periods, concerns that 
public and stakeholder trust in public administration had gone missing led to institutional 
responses of lasting significance that were specifically designed to maintain a viable balance 
in the relationship between the state and citizen. Thus the radical redesign of systems or the 
establishment of new institutions can be viewed as a necessary reactionary ‘just-in-time-
organisational [response] to social crisis’ (Jones 1992, p. 55). 
 Plausibly, we may be arriving at a similar moment in time. Already the Government has 
been forced to establish a new Health Service Safety Investigation Body (HSSIB), a body with 
specialised knowledge to investigate and understand local incidents and improve standards 
(Department of Health 2017). This solution was devised as a direct trust-enhancing response 
to crisis in the health sector following a series of major incidents in the NHS that raised serious 
safety concerns (e.g. Francis 2013). A similar set of concerns can be seen to exist in other areas 
of public administration that will need addressing, most noticeably around the Home Office 
mishandling of the Windrush affair (Williams 2020). Other high profile administrative errors 
are bound to emerge from the management of the coronavirus pandemic.
Even there is a sufficient breakdown in trust to create a window of opportunity for major 
reform, institutional theories of change predict that it will not lead to significant results if the 
‘change-oriented preferences’ of key stakeholders are unaligned or resistant to the possibilities. 
Here too though there are grounds for optimism that the motivations of relevant stakeholders 
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have shifted, and that some will be willing to act as policy entrepreneurs. Retaining trust and 
functionality, as well pursuing improvements, has been a common theme of recent 
pronouncements in the sector. 
On the prospect of this development, the OT Partnership is important as it signifies a 
coalescing amongst important interest groups in their understanding of the dominant problems 
in the current administrative justice system. Workshops organized by the AJC’s ombuds and 
tribunals familiarisation working group (e.g. see the minutes of October 2019 and February 
2020 (AJC 2020)) have assisted in bringing together ombuds and tribunal judges to identify 
and build awareness around existing problems. Such a partnership approach, therefore, is 
embedding a collective institutional learning (Thomas 2015, Jamiesson 1993) and shifting 
practice away from rigid processes towards more flexible interchanges. The OA is performing 
a similar service, as could broader umbrella organisations such as the Administrative Justice 
Council. Increasingly, both in terms of goals and solutions, a radical renewed vision for the 
administrative justice system is being voiced by key establishment figures, and expressed in 
similar terms. For instance, the sentiment of the Senior President’s speech (Ryder 2019) sits 
closely to the messages delivered by the current Parliamentary Ombudsman in a lecture three 
years previously (Behrens 2017). A familiar theme has been a recognition that the traditional 
structural approach to administrative justice is rooted in conservatism and is outdated, and that 
retaining trust in the system of justice is paramount. This need to move towards an enhanced 
focus on user access and participation, and a reduction in the silo approach to justice, is one 
that has been previously accepted by legislators and the judiciary (PASC 2014, Ministry of 
Justice 2016).
What we also see in this growing interest in change from a range of established 
institutions is the development of a small-c conservative argument for change to match the 
more common egalitarian arguments for powerful administrative justice institutions (Doyle and 
O’Brien 2020). One of the reasons why the input of the tribunal sector is important on the 
debate about reform is that the sector has many reasons to be sceptical of the potential for new 
ideas to transform the landscape. The judiciary, in particular, might be expected to be inherently 
resistant to any grand reform measure that impacts negatively on the long-understood model 
of justice that it oversees. But the argument that more radical change has become necessary in 
order to maintain the underlying goal of administrative justice for all is becoming 
overpowering. The result is a weakening desire to persist with current solutions, so long as 
through reform the core values of the current system can be retained and strengthened and the 
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potential for negative unforeseen consequences offset. An example here is the retention of a 
close relationship between the Parliamentary Ombudsman and Parliament. 
This combining of progressive and conservative arguments for change provides some 
hope that a broad cross-section of political and establishment thinking can be persuaded of the 
merits of reform. Certainly, there will be costs of transition, including for a range of impacted 
institutions, but equally it is well-charted that the potential benefits are multiple (e.g. Gill 2020) 
and include possible financial savings (Gordon 2014). Further, knowledge and implementation 
of the alternatives is growing. For instance, the Independent Office for Police Conduct has had 
its powers expanded to allow it to launch investigations without the need for referral or direct 
complaint (Policing and Crime Act 2017, s.17) and potentially to receive ‘super-complaints’ 
from designated bodies (Policing and Crime Act 2017, ss.25-27), again signalling a willingness 
to expand the opportunities for an ombudsman-like body to intervene. In this environment, it 
is plausible that the arguments against major reform in the ombudsman sector will dissipate. 
Revolutionary moment or managed restructuring?
It is not possible to predict future events, but this article has identified the main barriers to 
radical change in the sector and offered the hypothesis that the conditions have rarely been 
better set for such change. We conclude by identifying two scenarios for its implementation. 
In the first of these scenarios, change might occur through a ‘revolutionary moment’, 
triggered perhaps by a new government keen to set a fresh agenda. Radical experiments in 
government, however, are often too difficult to anticipate, or implement correctly, in one step 
(Considine et al 2009). The relatively secondary nature of the ombudsman’s work to the 
administrative justice system, also works against it becoming the focus of reform endeavours. 
Hence, an alternative hypothesis is that radical shifts in thinking are often staggered through a 
series of smaller-scale interventions, led by both government and relevant policy-makers, 
which in combination significantly alter the environment within which ombuds operate (Cortell 
and Peterson 1999). This implies a ‘managed restructuring’ within the ombudsman sector 
rather than a one-off formative moment. But it also implies that, given the nature of the ongoing 
changes to public administration that are likely to occur and the knowledge of stronger 
ombudsman models elsewhere, mere ‘managerial’ reforms (Kirkham and Thompson 2017) 
along the lines of the stalled Public Services Ombudsman Bill (Cabinet Office 2016) will be 
insufficient by themselves to deliver a sustainable solution. 
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1 A note on terminology: In this piece we use the term ombudsman and ombuds as the plural.
2 Across multiple papers, different factors can be identified (eg Beckstein (2019, pp. 625-7) details six) but these 
four are common in most accounts.
3 For instance, consider the profile of a film like I, Daniel Blake (see generally O’Brien 2018) or the reaction to 
the Windrush affair (Home Affairs Committee 2018).  
4 The Administrative Justice Council (AJC), an advisory body that largely relies upon the voluntary input of 
administrative justice providers, has set up a working group to monitor the OT partnership and future research is 
planned examine its output.
5 Under the Charities Act 2011, ss. 325 and 326 the Charities Commission can refer points of law to the Charity 
Tribunal. For a discussion, see Joint Committee on Draft Charities Bill 2003-04, para 241, Law Commission 
2017-19: ch. 15.
6 See the Pensions Ombudsman (Pension Schemes Act 1993, s. 150(7)) and the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FCA Handbook, DISP 3.4.2). Interestingly, with both the ombudsman sector and the Charities Commission the 
power has been used sparingly (Law Commission 2017-19: ch.15).
